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Not All That Glitters Is Gold:
The Effect of Attention and
Blogs on Investors’ Investing
Behaviors
Nan Hu1, Yi Dong2, Ling Liu1, and Lee J. Yao3
Abstract
This article investigates the relationship between a firm’s visibility in blogspaces, termed
blog exposure, and the cross-sectional stock returns. We show that blog exposure is funda-
mentally different from the traditional media coverage, and securities with low blog expo-
sure earn higher returns than stocks with high blog exposure. We further illustrate that
such an effect is more prominent for stocks with low institutional ownership. Contrary to
traditional media coverage, the return premium associated with blog exposure cannot be
explained by either the illiquidity hypothesis or the investor recognition hypothesis based
on the rational-agent framework. Instead, our results suggest that blog effect can be attrib-
uted to the limited attention theory and cannot be arbitraged due to investors’ self-
attribution and short-sale constraints. Our research points out the importance of blogs in
information dissemination, especially for the stocks with limited attention.
Keywords
blog, expected return, limited attention, self-attribution, short-sale constraints, word of
mouth communication
Introduction
In this article, we investigate whether a firm’s visibility within blogspaces, termed blog
exposure, can affect security pricing even if the blog itself does not supply any authentic
news. When controlling for environmental factors such as traditional media coverage and
analyst coverage, and various risk factors such as size, book-to-market (BM) ratio, beta,
and momentum, our results indicate that stocks with high blog exposure earn lower returns
than stocks with low blog exposure. These results are more pronounced among stocks with
lower institutional ownership. We also show that a portfolio composed of stocks with low
institutional ownership produces sustained future abnormal returns. Such returns peak
approximately 10 months after formation of the portfolio, and reverse sharply after that,
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displaying a long-term return reverse pattern. In addition, the abnormal returns of a portfo-
lio composed of stocks with high institutional ownership meander around zero over the
next 12 months after formation of the portfolio. We examine three plausible explanations
for this return premium, two from the rational-agent framework (liquidity and investor rec-
ognition) and one from the behavior finance framework (limited attention with short-sale
constraints). Surprisingly, contrary to media coverage, for which the return premium can be
explained by liquidity and investor recognition based on the rational-agent framework
(Merton, 1987), the return premium of blog exposure cannot be explained by that frame-
work. Instead, our findings show that a blog exposure premium originates from the joint
forces of biased disclosure of bloggers and limited attention of consumers. Such overvalua-
tion becomes larger over time due to consumers’ biased self-attribution, while the short-
sale constraints prevent such a premium from being arbitraged. Our results are most consis-
tent with the notion in Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). In addition, our results show that
the blog exposure effect is not subsumed by traditional media exposure, as documented by
Fang and Peress (2009). However, without mainstream media (e.g., news) planting a seed
of discussion, blog exposure actually has no impact on security returns.
Understanding the relation between blog exposure and stock returns is very important
for the marketing community and the finance community because it demonstrates how a
firm’s marketing strategy within blogspaces can influence elements of its finance strategy,
such as cost of capital. As a form of word of mouth (WOM)1, blogs represent the fastest
growing medium of personal publishing and the newest method of individual expression
and opinion on the Internet.2 In 2004, blogs were a fairly new phenomenon with only 5
million bloggers worldwide (Wright, 2006). However, at the time of writing this article,
according to www.BlogPulse.com, there were more than 126 million blogs on the World
Wide Web. We believe blogs are playing a role that is as important as that of newspapers
because (a) information in a blog is not a simple reflection of what is covered by traditional
news. In fact, many blogs address topics that are not covered by the mainstream media at
all. Blogs might either lead or follow traditional news and (b) blogs disseminate informa-
tion to a much broader audience faster and with in-depth analysis. In fact, compared with
other online media, blogs are viewed as more credible. In addition, compared with tradi-
tional sources, more than three quarters of respondents view blogs as moderate to very
credible.
This article adds to the growing body of studies of the valuation of online WOM litera-
ture (Antweiler & Frank, 2004; Tumarkin & Whitelaw, 2001; Wysocki, 1999). Our article
is also closely related to but distinct from Fang and Peress (2009)’s media coverage study
that shows that, by helping to reach a broad population of investors, mass media can allevi-
ate information frictions and affect stock price even if it does not contain authentic news.
However, Fang and Peress focus on studying the impact of traditional media coverage,
measured by the number of newspaper articles about a firm on its stock returns. We con-
centrate on examining the influence of nontraditional media coverage—blog exposure—on
security pricing, while controlling for the traditional media coverage. Furthermore, our
results are distinct from Fang and Peress’ conclusions. The return premium of news cover-
age can be explained by the rational-agent framework (Fang & Peress, 2009). However,
such a return premium of blog exposure can only be explained by the joint forces of inves-
tors’ behavior and short-sale constraints.
Another branch of literature related to our study is the behavior finance literature that
recognizes that attention influences investors’ selling and purchasing behavior, and causes
asset pricing deviation from its fundamental value. The underlying reason is that investors
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face a formidable search problem when buying a stock. Investors address such an issue by
limiting their choice sets (Barber & Odean, 2008) to those stocks that have recently caught
their attention (Odean, 1999). Because investors are overconfident (Daniel, Hirshleifer, &
Subrahmanyam, 1998; Odean, 1998) and biased toward self-attribution (Daniel et al.,
1998), stocks over bought heavily by individual investors will enjoy short-term positive
contemporaneous returns. These results emphasize the attention driven by traditional
media, such as securities mentioned in the news or securities that have gone through large
volume or price changes. Our study, however, focuses on the attention driven by nontradi-
tional media, blogs.
One practical implication of our results is that a firm’s visibility within blogspaces,
regardless of whether the blog discussion is positive or negative, influences investors’ pur-
chase decision. As a nontraditional media, blog discussions serve the role of disseminating
information that was traditionally covered by conventional information channels such as
analysts’ forecasts or newspapers. Such a role is especially important for stocks with lim-
ited attention. In fact, as we documented, because blog discussions do not affect the
expected stock returns when there is a lack of echo from the mainstream media, companies
should plant the seed of a discussion to foster the conversation within blogspaces.
Marketing managers of a firm can use blogs not only to communicate more efficiently with
its customers, partners, suppliers, and other stakeholders but also to work closely with
finance managers to lower the cost of capital by delivering information to a broader audi-
ence in a faster manner.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss our data
collection processes, elaborate our variable definitions, and present our empirical results. In
the section ‘‘Explaining the Blog Visibility Effect,’’ we discuss three possible causes of the
blog exposure effect, and in the section ‘‘Conclusion,’’ we present our concluding remarks.
Data Collection and Empirical Results
Data Collection
In this article, blog visibility/exposure is defined as the extent to which a company’s prod-
ucts or services are discussed in blogspaces. We collect such a measurement from
www.BlogPulse.com using its conversation track tool. Our data collection is composed of
two steps. In Step 1, we identify the brand names of products or services associated with a
company by searching a company’s web site, reading its financial reports, or using
researchers’ domain knowledge. In Step 2, using the names identified in Step 1 as key-
words, for each company, we retrieve its blog visibility over time using the conversation
tracker tool provided by www.BlogPulse.com. Of the total daily blogging activities traced
by www.BlogPulse.com, this measurement represents the percentage of the total blog con-
versation related to a particular firm, its products, or its services. It measures how (and
how much) a firm’s current customers, potential customers, competitors, industry peers,
and so on are talking about the products or services of the firm. Hence, it represents the
visibility of a firm within the overall blogspaces. Figure 1 shows one example of the blog
trend for Advance Auto Parts Inc.3
The data on a firm’s media exposure were collected from Factiva. Factiva is a database
of the Dow Jones and Reuters companies. It provides timely, domestic, and international
information, such as articles from the Dow Jones and Reuter’s newswires and The Wall
Street Journal. This information covers market data, firm and industry news, financial
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quotes, and newspaper articles. We collected and counted all the nonredundant news items
each day for the fiscal year of each company. Our analysts’ forecast data were collected
from the Institutional Brokers Estimates System. The company accounting data were
obtained from CompuStat, and the stock return data were from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). For detailed variable definitions, please refer to the appendix.
Following Amihud (2002), we delete one firm with extreme illiquidity value. The final
sample contains 404 Standard & Poor (S&P) 500 firms with daily blog visibility and tradi-
tional media coverage information from March 1, 2006, to August 22, 2006. We give
detailed variable definitions in the appendix. Following Fang and Peress (2009), to mini-
mize the noise of daily data, for each firm, we aggregate its daily blog visibility and
Factiva news to a monthly level to represent its blog visibility and media coverage, respec-
tively. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our key variables, including blog coverage
and media coverage. As we can see, only 1% of the stocks in our sample do not have
media coverage, but more than 25% of the stocks in our sample do not have blog coverage.
It seems that for the S&P 500 firms, and for this sample period, traditional media has
broader coverage in terms of the number of stocks discussed than blog conversations.
However, this does not necessarily mean that, in general, traditional news media has
broader coverage than blogs.
Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation among blog coverage, media coverage, and other
firm characteristics. We find blog coverage and media coverage are positively correlated,
and analysts, news, and blogs have the tendency to feature the same set of stocks. This is
reasonable because analysts, news, and blogs pay attention to large firms and well-known
firms. Furthermore, it seems that traditional media cares more about firms with a lower
Figure 1. Blog coverage data collection
Note: In this figure, we use Advance Auto Parts Inc. as an example to show how we collect the expo-
sure of a firm within blogspaces using www.blogpulse.com
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institutional ownership, whereas bloggers do not differentiate between firms with high insti-
tutional ownership and those with low institutional ownership.
Blog Coverage and Short-Term Cross-Section of Stock Return
In this section, we study whether a firm’s exposure within blogspaces affects its security
pricing by regressing stock returns on blog coverage, with media coverage, beta, size, BM
ratio, and other risk factors controlled (Table 3, Model 1). For a robustness check, we take
an incremental approach by adding momentum, media coverage, percentage of institutional
ownership, and illiquidity one by one, and present the results in Models 2, 3, and 4 of
Table 3, respectively. To control for the potential confounding effect caused by the differ-
ence across months and industries, we also include month fixed effect and industry fixed
effect (two-digital standard industrial classification from CRSP) in all our models.
For Model 1, the coefficient of blog exposure is 20.0026 with t-value at 21.93, which
is negatively associated with the following month’s stock return. Therefore, stocks with
high blog exposure tend to have lower stock returns compared with the stocks with low
blog coverage. Such an impact is not subsumed when we add the traditional media expo-
sure and other risk factors (Models 3 and 4). Furthermore, using Factiva as proxy for
media coverage, we found that media coverage has an insignificant coefficient regardless
of whether we exclude the blog exposure. The untabulated table shows that our results are
qualitatively the same if we exclude those firm-month observations in which there are earn-
ing announcements for the firm in that month. Therefore, we conclude that the blog effect
is not driven by month effect, industry effect, or earnings announcements.
Our media coverage results are different from those of Fang and Peress (2009).
However, in their article, they focus on four influential newspapers with large subscrip-
tions. Our media coverage includes all the newspapers included in the Factiva database.
Another reason for the different results might lie in the sample selection. In their article,
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Blog Exposure and Media (Factiva) Coverage
Blog Factiva
M 0.40 M 236.42
SD 1.22 SD 415.45
Skewness 5.66 Skewness 3.50
Quintile Quintile
100% maximum 11.89 100% maximum 2,791.00
99% 7.38 99% 2,267.00
95% 1.90 95% 1,085.00
90% 0.80 90% 535.00
75% Q3 0.22 75% Q3 224.00
50% median 0.04 50% median 95.00
25% Q1 0.00 25% Q1 41.00
10% 0.00 10% 19.00
5% 0.00 5% 7.00
1% 0.00 1% 0.00
0% minimum 0.00 0% minimum 0.00
Note: See the appendix for detailed variable definitions.
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they argue that the most significance of high media coverage, low return effect comes from
the small and illiquid firms. However, in our article, we use only S&P 500 firms, which are
all big firms.
Blog Coverage and Long-Term Cross-Section of Stock Returns
In the previous section, we documented the short-term return premium associated with low
blog exposure firms. In this section, we study the long-term return impact of blog exposure.
Figure 2 represents the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks with different blog coverage,
starting from Month 1 after the portfolio formation. Each month, we sort our sample into
three groups according to their monthly blog exposure. Then, based on capital asset pricing
model, for each stock, we estimate its abnormal return in the subsequent 13 months. Low
blog curve (Figure 2) represents the average abnormal returns for the lowest blog coverage
group, whereas high blog curve represents those of the highest blog coverage group. Figure
2 shows that the highest blog coverage portfolio consistently has insignificant abnormal
returns starting from the 1st month after the formation of the portfolio to the next 13
Table 2. Pearson Correlation
Blog Factiva Size BM Momentum Dispersion IO Coverage Illiquidity Idiorisk
Blog 1
2353
Factiva 0.1550 1
\0.0001
2,353 2,353
Size 0.1334 0.5198 1
\0.0001 \0.0001
2,346 2,346 2,346
BM 20.1214 20.0383 20.2583 1
\0.0001 0.0685 \0.0001
2,261 2261 2,259 2,261
Momentum 20.0740 20.0242 0.0886 20.1616 1
0.0003 0.24 \0.0001 \0.0001
2,352 2,352 2,345 2,261 2,352
Dispersion 0.0125 0.0050 0.0076 20.0384 0.0218 1
0.5513 0.8131 0.7169 0.0722 0.3008
2,266 2,266 2,263 2,191 2,266 2,266
IO 0.0088 20.1053 0.0614 20.0905 0.2115 20.0500 1
0.6695 \0.0001 0.0029 \0.0001 \0.0001 0.0173
2,353 2,353 2,346 2,261 2,352 2,266 2,353
Coverage 0.1293 0.3358 0.6064 20.1358 0.0195 0.0012 0.0353 1
\0.0001 \0.0001 \0.0001 \0.0001 0.3528 0.9549 0.0916
2,281 2,281 2,278 2,201 2,281 2,266 2,281 2,281
Illiquidity 20.0212 20.0369 20.2677 0.0348 20.0602 20.0399 20.1454 20.1501 1
0.3043 0.0732 \0.0001 0.0983 0.0035 0.0578 \0.0001 \0.0001
2,353 2,353 2,346 2,261 2,352 2,266 2,353 2,281 2,353
Idiorisk 20.0038 20.0725 20.3569 20.0612 0.1148 0.0035 0.0578 20.0635 0.2501 1
0.8558 0.0004 \0.0001 0.0036 \0.0001 0.8681 0.005 0.0024 \0.0001
Note: BM = book to market; IO = institutional ownership. For detailed variable definitions, refer to the appendix.
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months, and the low blog coverage portfolio enjoys a positive coverage abnormal return in
the following 13 months. In addition, there is a return reversal when the cumulative abnor-
mal returns peak at the 10th month.
Figure 2. Cumulative abnormal return
Note: CAPM = capital asset pricing model; CAR = coverage abnormal return. Figure 2 presents the
cumulative abnormal return of a high blog coverage sample and a low blog coverage sample starting
from Month 1 after the portfolio formation. Each month we sort our sample into two groups accord-
ing to its monthly blog coverage. Then, based on CAPM model, for each stock, we estimate its cumu-
lative abnormal return in the subsequent 13 months. The blue line represents the average CAR for
the low blog coverage group, whereas the red line plots that of the high blog coverage group.
Table 3. Blog Coverage, Media Coverage, and Stock Returns
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.0116 (20.45) 0.0295 (21.03) 20.0043 (20.15) 0.0041 (20.12)
Blog 20.0026 (21.93) 20.0033 (22.45) 20.0033 (22.39)
Factiva 0.0000 (20.87) 0.0000 (20.65) 0.0000 (20.65)
Beta 20.0026 (21.1) 20.0028 (21.78) 0.0003 (20.13) 0.0002 (20.06)
Size 0.0024 (1.72) 0.0012 (0.70) 0.0021 (1.23) 0.0019 (0.87)
BM 0.0042 (1.78) 0.0040 (1.72) 0.0012 (0.51) 0.0013 (0.56)
Momentum 20.0323 (25.79) 20.0311 (25.36)
Coverage 20.0001 (20.25)
IO 20.0034 (20.68)
Illiquidity 20.0203 (20.95)
Adjust_R2 .1119 .1107 .1253 .1246
Note: BM = book to market; IO = institutional ownership; SIC = standard industrial classification. In this table, the
dependent variable is the following month’s stock return. The independent variables include traditional risk factors
and other firm characteristics that may affect expected stock returns. Our samples include 404 distinct firms. We
run pooled regression, controlling month fixed effect and industry fixed effect (2-digital SIC).
Nextmonthre5a1bbeta3 beta1bsize3 size1bBM3BM1bmomentum3momentum 1bIO3 IO1bcoverage3
coverage1billiquility3 illiquility3bblog3 blog1bFactiva3 Factiva:
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Our results are not driven by the return reversals among no-coverage stocks because the
abnormal returns associated with low blog visibility firms do not reverse until 10 months
after the portfolio formation, while a typical return reversal pattern among no-news losers
is short lived (Chan, 2003). Given that our blog coverage effect represents a long-term
effect, there must be a force to prevent traders from such arbitrage. So what are the driving
forces?
Explaining the Blog Visibility Effect
In this section, we examine three potential explanations of the return premium associated
with blog exposure: illiquidity, investors’ recognition, and bloggers’ limited attention and
short-sale constraints. The first two are based on the rational-agent framework, whereas the
third explanation originates from behavior finance literature.
Illiquidity Hypothesis
Fang and Peress (2009) document that stocks with no media coverage enjoy higher returns
than stocks with high media coverage. Furthermore, such a return premium is very stable
over time. They believe that the lack of liquidity explains why such an abnormal return
cannot be arbitraged. Hence, we first test whether blog visibility is similar to media cover-
age aroused due to illiquidity. According to the rational-agent framework, if the blog effect
represents an arbitrage opportunity, it can only be persistent in the situation where some
kind of impediment to trade prevents arbitrage. Hence, if the blog visibility effect is also
caused by illiquidity, we expect the blog effect to be most significant in the portfolios that
are composed of the most illiquid stocks.
We use multivariate regressions (either separate regressions for each portfolio or pooled
together) to study whether the illiquidity can explain the cross-sectional return differences
we document. Each month we sort our sample into three portfolios based on various illi-
quidity proxies proposed by previous literature including the Amihud (2002) illiquidity
ratio, bid/ask spread, trading price, and firm size. Stocks with the highest illiquidity ratio or
spread, or stocks with the lowest price or size, are the most illiquid ones. For each illiquid-
ity proxy and each portfolio, the following month’s stock returns are regressed on blog cov-
erage with other controlled factors that are known to affect the cross-section of returns,
such as beta, size, BM ratio, and momentum. To control for the potential heterogeneity
across months as well as industries, we run our regression by controlling month and indus-
try effects.
Table 4 reports the blog effect of stocks sorted by different illiquidity proxies. Due to
space constraint, for each portfolio under different illiquidity measures, we report only the
coefficient before blog coverage and the corresponding t statistic. If the blog visibility
effect is caused by illiquidity, we expect the blog exposure effect to be most significant in
the portfolios composed of the most illiquid stocks, such as stocks with the highest illiquid-
ity and spread or those with the lowest price or size. However, the results shown in Table 4
fail to support the illiquidity hypothesis. For example, with respect to the Amihud illiquid-
ity ratio, blog effect is significant in the low illiquidity portfolio (para = 20.0068 and
t-value = 23.04) and the medium illiquidity portfolio (para = 20.0058 and t-value =
22.9), but not in the high illiquidity portfolio (para = 0.0022 and t-value = 0.67). This con-
tradicts the illiquidity hypothesis that high impediments of trade should result in the most
significant blog exposure effect. Similar examples of evidence are found when we use
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alternative illiquidity measurements. Using price or firm size to proxy for liquidity, we
observe that the blog exposure associated return premium is most significant in the portfo-
lios composed of the most liquid stocks, for example, stocks with highest trading prices
(para = 20.0065 and t-value = 21.68) or stocks with the biggest firm sizes (para =
20.0072 and t-value = 23.57). In addition, we also use bid/ask spread to proxy for illiquid-
ity because highly illiquid stocks often have a large bid/ask spread. The coefficients of
blog visibility for low and medium bid/ask spread portfolios are negative and significant
but not for the high bid/ask spread portfolio (para = 20.0015 and t-value = 20.55)—the
most illiquid stocks. Overall, our results show that the blog visibility effect disappears
among the most illiquid stocks, hence are contrary to the illiquidity theory that suggests
that the blog visibility effect should be the strongest for most illiquid securities.
To check the robustness of the above results, for each illiquidity proxy, we run a pooled
regression using all three portfolios. To be more specific, for each illiquidity proxy, we
first define one dummy variable to distinguish high illiquidity firms from low illiquidity
firms. For example, the dummy variable Rank for Amihud illiquidity is set to one if the illi-
quidity ratio of that firm is higher than the median Amihud illiquidity ratio, and zero other-
wise. Then, in addition to the original independent variables, we also include an interaction
term between the blog coverage variable and the illiquidity dummy variable Rank to test
whether the blog exposure effect is more significant for stocks with higher illiquidity. Our
untabulated results show that consistent with the conclusions from running separate regres-
sions, results using pooled regressions also demonstrate that illiquidity cannot explain the
blog exposure effect that we have documented.
Investors’ Recognition Hypothesis
Fang and Peress (2009) posit that, in addition to illiquidity, the investor recognition theory
proposed by Merton (1987) can also explain the media coverage effect they observe. Under
this theory, investors are assumed to have incomplete information and are aware of only a
subset of the available stocks. For stocks with less investor recognition, investors with
incomplete information will require higher returns as a compensation for the undiversified
risk and market clearing. Therefore, we hypothesize that if blog coverage can increase a
stock’s recognition, then the blog effect should be more prominent for stocks with a low
degree of investor recognition. Several measures, including analyst coverage, idiosyncratic
Table 4. Illiquidity and the Blog Effect
Low Medium High
Parameter t-value Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Illiquidity 20.0068 23.04 20.0058 22.39 0.0022 0.67
Spread 20.0042 21.88 20.0048 21.90 20.0015 20.55
Price 20.0040 21.46 20.0079 23.20 20.0065 21.68
Firm size 0.0004 0.14 20.0015 20.40 20.0072 23.57
Note: In this table, each month we classified our sample into three portfolios according to their respective illiquid-
ity proxies. We use the Amihud illiquidity ratio (Amihud 2002), bid ask spread, size of the firm, and price to proxy
for illiquidity. The following months’ stock returns are regressed on blog coverage, beta, size, BM ratio, and
momentum, controlling month fixed effect and industry fixed effect. For brevity, for each portfolio under different
illiquidity measures, we report only the coefficient before blog coverage and corresponding t statistic.
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risk, advertising expenditure, and the number of investors of a stock, are adopted as proxies
for investors’ recognition. Analyst coverage is selected because investors listen to analysts
to make investment decisions, and stocks with high analyst coverage are assumed to have a
high degree of investor recognition. Idiosyncratic risk is adopted as another investor recog-
nition measure because it represents the imperfect diversification driven by a lack of inves-
tors’ recognition (AHXZ 2006). Furthermore, following previous literature (Grullon,
Kanatas, & Weston, 2004; Singh, Faircloth, & Nejadmalayeri, 2005), we develop two addi-
tional investor recognition measures: advertising expenditure and the number of common
shareholders of a security.
Following the methods in the illiquidity hypothesis test section, we examine whether the
blog effect can be explained by investors’ recognition using a separate regression approach
and a pooled regression approach. For the separate regression methods, again we sort our
sample into three portfolios in each month according to different investor recognition mea-
sures. Then, for each investor recognition proxy and each portfolio, following months’
returns are regressed on blog visibility while controlling for other factors that are known to
affect the cross-section of returns such as beta, size, BM ratio, and momentum (Table 5).
Similarly, as in the section ‘‘Illiquidity Hypothesis,’’ we also ran pooled regressions to
study the impact of investor recognition measures on stock returns and reach very similar
conclusions as when we followed a separate regression approach.
Table 5 presents the results of separate regressions for portfolios with different degrees
of investor recognition. Following Table 4, for each investor recognition proxy, we report
only the coefficient and t-value of blog coverage in each portfolio. As we can see, when
investor recognition is measured by idiosyncratic risk, the coefficient of blog visibility is
significant only for the low and medium idiosyncratic risk portfolios, but not for the high
idiosyncratic risk portfolio. In addition, the absolute value of the coefficient of the low
idiosyncratic risk portfolio is bigger than that of the medium idiosyncratic risk portfolio.
This indicates that the blog effect is more significant in portfolios with high investor recog-
nition, failing to support the hypothesis that the blog exposure effect can be explained by
investors’ recognition. We reach a similar conclusion when we use analyst coverage, adver-
tisement expenditure, and number of investors as proxies for investor recognition. The blog
effect is much more prominent for stocks with higher analyst coverage, medium advertise-
ment expenditure, and a medium investor base. None of these evidences support the inves-
tor recognition hypothesis.
Table 5. Investor Recognition and the Blog Effect
Low parameter t-value Medium parameter t-value High parameter t-value
Idiorisk 20.0088 23.60 20.0069 23.18 0.0004 0.16
Coverage 20.0012 20.42 20.0037 21.31 20.0077 23.37
Expenditure 0.0035 0.23 20.0068 22.33 20.0012 20.39
Investor base 20.0040 21.47 20.0061 22.50 20.0016 20.53
Note: In this table, each month we sort our sample into three portfolios according to different investor recogni-
tion proxies, including analyst coverage, idiosyncratic risk, advertising expenditure, and the number of investors of
a stock. The following months’ stock returns are regressed on blog visibility, beta, size, BM ratio, and momentum
as well as month fixed effect and industry fixed effect. For brevity, for each portfolio under different illiquidity mea-
sures, we report only the coefficient before blog coverage and the corresponding t statistic.
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Limited Attention Hypothesis and Short-Sale Constraints
Based on the rational-agent framework, the illiquidity hypothesis and the investors’ recog-
nition hypothesis are able to explain how news media coverage drives the cross-section of
stock returns (Fang & Peress, 2009). However, such a rational-agent framework cannot jus-
tify the blog exposure effect we have documented in the section ‘‘Data Collection and
Empirical Results.’’ Given that the blog exposure effect persists over time, there must be
other forces driving this return premium and preventing it from being arbitraged.
In this section, we propose that the limited attention theory (Hirshleifer et al., 2009)
offers an explanation for the cross-sectional return differences we document, while the
short-sale constraints sustain such return premium over time. From a disclosure prospec-
tive, blogs serve as a positively biased disclosure channel. Investors with limited attention
will selectively interpret the biased disclosure by assuming that no news is good news. This
will make investors net buyers of low blog exposure stocks. The biased interpretation beha-
vior of investors on blog disclosure is consistent with the framework proposed by
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) about how investors interpret the disclosures of those firms with
limited attention. To make matters worse, investors with limited attention are overconfident
(Daniel et al., 1998) and biased toward self-attribution (Daniel et al., 1998). In other words,
individual investors believe they are better in assessing blog information (i.e., overconfi-
dent) and they selectively trust the messages in WOM and selectively validate their beliefs
(i.e., biased toward self-attribution). The overall net buying behavior will be sustained over
an even longer period of time.
Are investors net buyers of low blog exposure securities? To prove that consumers are more
likely to be net buyers of securities with low blog exposure, we estimate the percentages of
buy transactions out of the daily total number of transactions for a high blog exposure portfo-
lio and a low blog exposure portfolio, respectively (Figure 3). We follow the buy and sell
classification algorithm proposed by Lee and Ready (1991), which is commonly used in
early literature, such as Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996), and Easley, Hvidkjaer,
and O’Hara (2002). Following Lee and Ready (1991), a transaction is defined as a buy (sell)
if it is executed above (below) the midpoint of the bid and ask price. For trades on the bid/
ask midpoints, we use a ‘‘tick test’’ to determine whether it is a buy or sell. To be more spe-
cific, a trade is a buy (sell) if it is executed at a higher (lower) price than the previous trade.
For those trades that have the same price as the previous trade, we look at the historical price
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Figure 3. Percentage of buy over time
Note: This figure presents the percentage of buy transaction for firms with the low daily blog cover-
age during the subsequent 30 days after portfolio formation. We sort our sample into 2 portfolios
based on their daily blog coverage, and low (high) daily blog coverage firms include those whose daily
coverage is lower (higher) than the median blog coverage on that day. We also conduct a similar anal-
ysis by sorting our sample into 4 or 10 portfolios and reach a similar conclusion.
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until we find a change in the trade price. Following Lee and Ready, for the computation, we
match our trade prices with 5-s-old quotes. After classifying the buy and sell for each trade,
we cumulate the number of buys and sells in a day to get the aggregated daily number of
buy and sell. Then the daily percentage buy is defined as the total number of buy transactions
divided by the total number of all transactions on that day.
Figure 3 presents the percentage of buy transactions for firms with low daily blog cover-
age for the 30 days subsequent to portfolio formation. We sort our sample into 2 portfolios
based on their daily blog coverage. Low (high) daily blog coverage firms include those
whose daily coverage is lower (higher) than the median blog coverage on that day. We also
conduct a similar analysis by sorting our sample into 4 or 10 portfolios and reach a similar
conclusion. Our results show that, regardless of the magnitude of blog exposure, on aver-
age, there is an increase in the percentage of buy transactions after the portfolio formation,
which might be driven by the overall market situation. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows that,
compared with the high blog exposure portfolio, the low blog exposure portfolio has a
higher percentage of buy transactions.4 The untabulated mean difference comparison also
validates this conclusion (difference = 0.0022 and t-value = 3.99). In addition, this differ-
ence remains relatively stable over time after portfolio formation. In addition, the untabu-
lated results show that most of the increase in the percentage of buy transactions
concentrates on small investors.
Short-sale constraints. In our previous section, we documented that because investors with
limited attention become net buyers of low blog exposure securities, stock prices go up.
How about institutional investors or other rational investors? Why do they not come in and
fix this ‘‘irrational’’ behavior? We believe that the short-sale constraints might be one of
the answers. Short-sale constraints can prevent the arbitrage from happening, hence making
the return pattern we observe last longer.5 We expect, if short-sale constraints can explain
the blog exposure effect, that effect should be concentrated in a portfolio composed of
stocks with the highest short-sale constraints. Following Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005),
we use institutional ownership of a firm as a proxy for its short-sale constraints, and a firm
with high institutional ownership is treated as the one with low short-sale constraints.
Table 6 shows that the blog effect is significant only in low institutional ownership
groups (para = 20.0067 and t-value = 22.58), representing a high sale constraints situa-
tion. Such evidence supports our hypothesis that the blog effect we documented can be
explained by short-sale constraints.
Relationship Between Blog Exposure and Media Coverage
Our readers might question how securities with low blog exposure get attention. If nobody
ever talks about a stock, how can investors be aware of it? Hence, in this section, we study
Table 6. Short-Sale Constraints and the Blog Effect
Variable Low IO parameter t-value Medium IO parameter t-value High IO parameter t-value
Blog 20.0067 22.58 20.0036 21.40 20.0020 20.82
Note: IO = institutional ownership; BM = book to market. In this table, in each month, we sort our sample into
three portfolios according to their short-sale constraints proxy, the institutional ownership. Then the following
month’s stock returns are regressed on blog visibility, beta, size, BM ratio, and momentum, as well as month fixed
effect and industry fixed effect. For brevity, for each portfolio, we report only the coefficient and t-value of blog
coverage
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where the attention comes from. We believe that blog exposure needs to be built on news
attention. Hence, we investigate whether our blog effect will be subsumed under the
recently documented media effect (Fang & Peress, 2009). We first sort our sample into
three portfolios according to their monthly media coverage, proxied by Factiva. Then for
each portfolio, we regress the following month’s stock returns on blog coverage, size, beta,
BM ratio, and momentum. Table 7 shows that, with traditional media coverage controlled,
the blog effect is significant only in high media coverage portfolios and is insignificant in
low and medium media coverage portfolios. Our interpretation is that blog conversations
are not a simple reflection of the information content of traditional media; hence, the blog
effect cannot be fully subsumed by it. As a result, to really force the market to listen to
blog conversations, mainstream media need to plant seeds to spark the discussion; other-
wise, a simple blog conversation without a mainstream echo will have no market response.
Furthermore, even with heavy traditional media coverage, blog conversations will not be
buried and will still stimulate market responses.
Conclusion
In this article, we investigate the relation between blog coverage and the cross-sectional
stock returns. We show that blog coverage is different from the traditional media coverage
documented by previous literature (Fang & Peress, 2009). We find that high blog coverage
is associated with low stock returns, even when controlling for other risk factors and tradi-
tional media coverage. We further illustrate that such an effect is more prominent for
stocks with low institutional ownership and cannot be explained by either the illiquidity
hypothesis or the investor recognition hypothesis, which have been shown in explaining the
cross-sectional relation between media coverage and expected stock returns. Our interpreta-
tion is that the blog coverage effect is caused by the selective interpretation of investors
with limited attention on the blog posting. The abnormal returns associated with the blog
exposure effect are sustained over time and cannot be arbitraged within a short period of
time due to short-sale constraints. All these things make blogs an important information
dissemination channel.
However, we should carefully interpret our results because there may be some other
mechanism that might cause the same phenomena we documented. For example, if overall
blog contents are negative instead of positive, then ‘‘no news is good news’’ might actually
be a rational response in the blog coverage context. If investors with limited attention fail
to understand such a relation, then investors with limited attention are likely to be pessimis-
tic about firms with low blog coverage compared with rational investors, which will lead to
undervaluation in the current period. If stocks with low blog coverage are undervalued in
the current period, subsequently they outperform stocks with high blog exposure. Even
Table 7. Relationship Between Factiva and Blog
Factiva Low parameter t-value Medium parameter t-value High parameter t-value
Blog 0.0001 0.03 0.00 20.9700 20.00426 22.1800
Note: We sort our sample into three portfolios in each month according to their media coverage, proxy by
Factiva. Then the following month’s stock returns are regressed on blog visibility, beta, size, BM ratio, and momen-
tum as well as month fixed effect and industry fixed effect. For brevity, for each portfolio, we report only the coef-
ficient and t-value of blog coverage.
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though for our data set, our untabulated sentiment mining results rule out such an explana-
tion,6 future research might look deep into this issue with new data set covering big,
medium, and small firms, and across a longer period of time to draw more insights.
Our study offers great insights as to the importance of the marketing activities of a firm
on its expected return. Our results justify the buzz value creation of marketing strategy on
firm’s valuation. Our study also has policy implications for government agencies, such as
the Securities and Exchange Commission because it brings to the forefront the effect and
importance of blog information in the market valuation of firms. This is especially impor-
tant for those firms with many small and naı¨ve investors, who have limited channels to
access and limited capabilities to process/digest value-relevant information.
Appendix
Variable Definitions
Variable Definitions
Coverage Analyst coverage is from the summary statistics database of Institutional
Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S). It is based on the variable Numest
(number of estimates), which represents the total number of estimators
covering the company for the fiscal period (annual forecast only).
Beta Used to control market risk, run capital asset pricing model regression using
previous 60-month data.
Blog Monthly blog coverage, defined as a sum of daily blog coverage.
Book to market Log of (book value/market value).
Dispersion Analyst forecast dispersion, from the summary statistics database of I/B/E/S
database. It is based on stdev/medest, where stdev represents the standard
deviation of the forecast and medest represents the median estimation of
forecast for the fiscal period (annual forecast only).
Expenditure Advertising expense from CompuStat Merged Fundamental Annual File. It is
based on the variable XAD.
Factiva Monthly media coverage, defined as a sum of daily newspaper news, from
Factiva.
Idiorisk Idiosyncratic risk, follow AHXZ (2006).
Illiquidity Follow Amihud (2002) method.
Investor base Number of common shareholders (CSHR)/ordinary shareholders of a stock.
It is based on CSHR collected from CompuStat.
Institutional
ownership (IO)
IO from Thomson Reuters. IO is defined as all the shares held by institutional
investors divided by shares outstanding. It is on quarterly basis. Each month,
we use the IO of previous quarter as the IO for that month. We also match
monthly IO with the nearest quarterly end IO. Qualitatively, both measures
result in similar results.
Momentum Previous 12-month cumulative return.
Size Log of market value, defined as PRC 3 SHROUT based on Center for
Research in Security Prices’ (CRSP) monthly file, where PRC is the closing
price and SHROUT is the common shares outstanding.
Spread Monthly bid ask spread (ask high minus bid low).
Volume Monthly trading volume based on CRSP monthly file; it is the sum of the
trading volumes during that month.
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Notes
1. Blog content is written by authors (also known as bloggers). It is a form of word of mouth.
Typically, there are websites comprising blog posts that are organized into categories and sorted
in reverse chronological order. Most blogs allow readers to comment on individual blog
posts.—Adopted from Wright (2006).
2. www.blogpulse.com. BlogPulse is an automated trend discovery system for blogs. BlogPulse
applies machine-learning and natural-language processing techniques to discover trends in the
highly dynamic world of blogs.
3. We admit that there might be some noise in the blog exposure proxy, depending on the types
and the number of blogs www.BlogPulse.com covered. However, given the large number of
blogs www.BlogPulse.com covered, we believe the blog exposure as measured by
www.BlogPulse.com is representative of the overall discussion on blogspaces. Furthermore, each
security’s blog exposure as retrieved from www.BlogPulse.com might either underestimate or
overestimate the true volume of blog conversation, depending on the keywords we specify as
well the algorithm www.BlogPulse.com uses to identify the information related to a firm.
However, we believe the results of such an estimate noise are more likely to be biased against
our findings.
4. We should be aware that there is another mechanism that might result in the return difference
between the high blog exposure stocks and the low blog exposure stocks. Investors are net sellers
of the securities with high blog exposure. However, Figure 2 results rule out such a possibility.
If that were true, the portfolio composed of high blog exposure stocks should have big and pro-
longed negative returns, but that is not the case. The portfolio return of high exposure stocks is,
in fact, meandering around zero.
5. Following Fang and Peress (2009), in our article, we use investor recognition to refer to
the model of Merton (1987) under the more traditional rational-agent framework, whereas the
limited attention refers to the behavior financial model (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2008).
Even though one of the key assumptions of the investor recognition hypothesis (tested in the
section ‘‘Investors’ Recognition Hypothesis’’) is that investors know about only the subset
of the available stocks, Merton’s (1987) model is built on the rational-agent framework and is
different from the limited attention hypothesis we study here. In Merton’s model, attention
grabbing by itself will not influence an investor’s purchase decision, whereas in our case, it
does.
6. Our unreported sentiment mining results of the blog contents collected from LexisNexis database
show that overall blog contents are dominated by positive sentiments.
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